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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING
This is an appeal from an Order of the Honorable Timothy R Hanson. Third Judicial
District Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
an Order to Show Cause and extending Defendant's formal AP&P probation for a term of
len years minus the three years previously served.

The Utah Court of Appeals has

jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL, STANDARD OF APPELLATE
REVIEW AND PRESERVATION BELOW
The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County in and for the State of Utah
wrongfully denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Order to Show Cause and erroneously
ruled the Court had jurisdiction to extend the Defendant's probation for a period often years
(minus three years previously served on probation). "Whether the trial court had the
authority to extend Defendant's probation is a question of law. We accord a trial court's
conclusions of law no particular deference, reviewing them for correctness." State v. Wilcox,
808 P.2d 1028, 1031 (Utah 1991); State v. Rowlings, 893 P.3d 1063, 1066-67 (Utah App.
1995). Also, "(b)ecause the interpretation of a statute presents a question of law, we review
for correctness." State v. Amador, 804 P.2d 1233, 1234 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Grate,
947P.2d 1161, 1164 (Utah App. 1997).
This issue was preserved in the lower court upon the Defendant's filing of a Motion
to Dismiss Order to Show Cause for Lack of Jurisdiction and Memorandum in Support
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thereof, and oral argument relating to said Motion, as well as the Judge's ruling denying
Defendant's Motion (R. 234-378, 481, Add. 4, 386-394).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following statute is relevant to the issues presented on appeal and is attached as
Addendum 1:
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant David J. Orr was initially charged with twenty-eight felonies including
Securities Fraud, Communications Fraud, Unregistered Securities Agent and Pattern of
Unlawful Activity (R. 2-8). On March 23, 2000, Defendant entered a Change of Plea to the
amended charge of Attempted Securities Fraud, a third degree felony (Count 8) and
Unlicensed Broker-Dealer or Agent, a third degree felony (Count 20) (R. 20-21). On May
12. 2000. Defendant was sentenced by the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson to two
indeterminate terms not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison to run consecutively.
At the same time, the Court suspended the prison terms and placed Defendant on probation
for three years to be supervised by the Utah Adult Probation & Parole Department ("AP&P")
with numerous conditions, including that Defendant serve six months in the Salt Lake County
Jail with no credit for time served, and pay restitution as determined by his probation officer.
Defendant was required to pay no less than $1,000.00 per month toward restitution or 25%
of his income under the direction of AP&P (R. 22-27).

?

Defendant performed satisfactorily during his three years (36 months) of probation,
but on May 13.2003, Court records show that an AP&P Progress/Violation Report was filed
with the Court (R. 228-229). On May 19, 2003, an Order to Show Cause was entered by the
Third District Court (signed on May 13,2003 by Judge Hanson) alleging that the Defendant
had violated the terms and conditions of his probation "by having failed to pay restitution in
full, as ordered, in violation of a special condition of the Probation Agreement/' (Add. 2 &
3) (R. 230-231, 232-233). On or about May 23, 2003, Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss
Order to Show Cause for Lack of Jurisdiction and a Memorandum in Support thereof (R.
234-378).
The Court held a hearing on June 23,2003 and denied Defendant's Motion to Dismiss
from the Bench and indicated a formal Memorandum Decision and Order would be
forthcoming (R. 383-384).' The Court filed its Memorandum Decision and Order on July
2,2003 formally denying Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction and ruling
that the Court had jurisdiction and authority to extend Defendant's probation for a maximum
often years because the Court had sentenced the Defendant to two 0-5 year terms in the Utah
State Prison, and had suspended those terms ( Add. 4, R. 386-394). The Court also
concluded that it was not required to place the Defendant on a bench probation as argued by

1

The Court apparently combined the hearing on the Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss with the Probation Revocation hearing, although Defendant was not asked to
admit or deny the allegations in the Order to Show Cause and no evidence was presented
as to the Defendant's willful failure to pay restitution. Further the Judge made no
findings on this issue. See Point III infra.

the Defendant under the provisions of U.C.A. § 77-18-10(a)(ii)(A) (sic) "because the
Defendant's probation did not expire or terminate under § 77-18-10(a)(i) (sic), but was
instead tolled under § 77-18-1(1 l)(b)M (Add. 4, p. 6, R. 391).
Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal from the Court's Decision on July 9, 2003
bringing us to the present proceedings (R. 395-396).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
1.

Defendant David J. Orr was originally charged with twenty-eight felonies under

the securities laws of the State of Utah (R. 2-8).
2.

On or about March 23, 2000, Defendant waived preliminary hearing and

entered a plea of guilty to Attempted Securities Fraud, a third degree felony (Count 8
amended) and Unlicensed Broker-Dealer or Agent (Count 20) also a third degree felony (R.
20-21).
3.

On May 12, 2000, the Defendant appeared before the Honorable Timothy R.

Hanson and was sentenced to two terms not to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison with
the sentences to run consecutively. The Court suspended the prison terms and placed the
Defendant on probation under certain specific conditions, including that the Defendant was
required to pay restitution as determined by the Adult Probation & Parole Department.
Defendant was required to pay no less than $1,000.00 per month toward his restitution, or
25% of his income, under the direction of the Adult Probation & Parole Department. The
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Court indicated a restitution hearing could be set upon appropriate application (R. 22-24,2529).
4.

Court records indicate that on May 13, 2003, a Progress/Violation Report was

filed by Probation Officer Robert Egelund requesting that the Court issue an Order to Show
Cause requiring Defendant Orr to appear and show cause, if any he has, why his probation
should not be revoked and he be committed to the Utah State Prison for the indeterminate
term as provided by law, the execution of which had been previously stayed by the Court,
"(B)y virtue of his having failed to pay restitution in full, as ordered, in violation of a special
condition of the probation agreement." (R. 228-229, Add. 2, 230-231).
5.

The Defendant was served with the Affidavit and Order to Show Cause on May

19, 2003 requiring him to appear before the Court on May 30, 2003 at 9:00 a.m. by Agent
Egelund (Add. 3. R. 232-233).
6.

Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Order to Show Cause and

Memorandum in Support thereof for lack of jurisdiction on or about May 22, 2003 (R. 234235,236-378).
7.

On or about June 23, 2003, the Court held a hearing regarding Defendant's

Motion to Dismiss at which the Defendant was present and represented by his attorney Larry
R. Keller and the State was present through its attorney Assistant Salt Lake County District
Attorney Howard R. Lemcke, Jr. (R. 383-384) (See footnote 1, p. 4 infra).
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8.

While the Court ruled from the bench regarding several of the issues on June

23,2003. the Court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order on or about July 2,2003 and
mailed it to the parties (Add. 4, R. 386-394).
9.

Defendant Orr filed his Notice of Appeal on July 9,2003 (R. 395-396), and his

Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause and Motion for Stay of Execution of the July 2,
2003 Order on or about August 29, 2003 (R. 425-427, 430-473).
10.

Although not indexed in the record on appeal the Court denied Defendant's

Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause on October 1. 2003, and Defendant appealed the
denial of the Motion for Certificate of Probable Cause by filing a Motion and Memorandum
in Support thereof as well as an Affidavit of Counsel in Support of said Motion with the Utah
Court of Appeals on November 24, 2003. Said Motion remains pending before this Court
at the time of the writing of this Brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant Orr maintains that the Court's jurisdiction to extend or modify his
probation ended by operation of law on either May 11, 2003 or May 12, 2003 and that
additional proceedings undertaken by the Court, and the Court's Order extending his
probation lor a period often years minus the three years he had already served on probation,
is in violation of Utah law. Defendant further argues that if the Court did have jurisdiction
over him, the Court can only extend his probation as a Court probation only and not a formal
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probation with the Adult Probation & Parole Department for purposes of enforcing the
Court's restitution order.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

DEFENDANT'S PROBATION ENDED BY OPERATION OF
LAW ON MAY 12, 2003, AND THE COURT LOST
JURISDICTION OVER HIM AT THAT TIME.

The record in the instant case shows that Defendant was sentenced by the Honorable
Timothy R. Hanson on May 12, 2000 (R. 22-29). The records further show that on May 13,
2003 an AP&P Progress/Violation Report and an Affidavit in Support of Order to Show
Cause were formally filed with the Court (Add. 2, R. 228-231). The record also shows that
the Court issued an Order to Show Cause on May 13, 2003 requiring the Defendant's
appearance in Court to answer to the allegation in the Affidavit (Add. 3) (R. 232-233). The
record shows that the Order to Show Cause itself was signed by the Court on May 13, 2003.
Id
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(10)(a)(i) reads as follows: "Probation may be terminated
at any time at the discretion of the court or upon completion without violation of 36 months
probation in felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C
misdemeanors or infractions/, Calculating a date which is thirty-six months from the date
of May 12, 2000, the date upon which Defendant was sentenced, his probation technically
terminated by law on May 11, 2003 at midnight; or, at the very least. May 12, 2003 at
midnight. It is Defendant's contention that May 12, 2003 was one day beyond thirty-six
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months, but his argument remains the same whether it was Ma\ 11, 2003 at midnight or May
12. 2003 at midnight, since documents were not formally filed with the Court and the Order
to Show Cause process was not begun according to the official Court record until May 13,
2003 (R. 228-233).
In its decision, the trial court engaged in the reasoning that, although Defendant was
placed on probation on May 12, 2000, ". . . the first day of probation would have concluded
twenty-four hours after the sentence was imposed on or at the close of business on the
following day. May 13,2000." See, Order attached as Addendum 4, R. 386-394 at 390-391.
The Court cites no authority for this position; and, in fact, on May 12, 2000, the Court
specifically ordered Defendant taken into custody and committed to the Salt Lake County Jail
for a period of six months as a condition of his probation. The Court had Defendant
handcuffed and removed from the courtroom on May 12, 2000 (R. 23-24).
If the Court's reasoning is correct, it did not have authority to send Defendant to jail
as a condition of probation until May 13, 2000, (twenty-four hours following the end of
business on May 12, 2000), yet the Court clearly believed that the Defendant was on
probation on May 12, 2000 by having him placed in handcuffs and having him taken
forthwith from the courtroom as a condition of that probation.
The Court further indicated that, although the records of the Third District Court
clearly show that the Progress/Violation Report was not formally filed with the Court until
May 13, 2003. the fact that probation officer Robert Egelund testified that he brought the
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Progress/Violation Report into the Court and date stamped it himself on May 9, 2003 was
dispositive of the matter.

The Court ruled that although the filing date on the

Progress/Violation Report was changed to May 13,2003, apparently by Court personnel the
Court intended to ignore such change. (Add. 4, p. 4, 5. R. 389, 390).
Although the Court opined from the bench that the change was probably made by his
clerk on the date that she filed the document, no testimony or evidence under oath was taken
to establish that fact in the Order to Show Cause hearing (R. 481, p. 26,1. 24, 25, p. 27,1. 111, p. 28, 1. 6-20, p. 29, 1. 1-5). Furthermore, the clerk of the court was not sworn and
provided no specific evidence to support the trial Judge's conclusion (R. 481 in its entirety).
The trial Judge stated from the bench that he recalled that Officer Egelund had come
to his office on Friday, May 9, 2003 and at that time he had authorized a filing of an Order
to Show Cause for the purpose of extending probation (R. 481, p. 9,1. 3-7, p. 28,1. 8-25, p.
29,1. 1-5, p. 30,1. 3-9, p. 33,1. 6-25). The trial Judge was not placed under oath and was not
examined or cross-examined by the parties, despite the fact that he purported to give
e\ iclcnce in this case. Because the issue in question was the very jurisdiction of the Court
to proceed with the Order to Show Cause the trial Judge signed according to the Court's own
record on May 13, 2003, after Defendant's probation ended according to Defendant's
calculation, the trial Judge's unsworn testimony and statements from the bench became
material to the case. It is the position of Defendant that once the Judge determined during

9

the course of the hearing that he had become a material witness, the Judge had an obligation
to recuse himself from further proceedings associated therewith.2
The Judge ruled in his Order of July 2, 2003 as follows:
"An alternative date for tolling the probationary period is the issuance of an
Order to Show Cause. The documents in this case reflect that the Court
approved and authorized issuance of the Order to Show Cause on May 12,
2003. . . r (Add. 4. p. 5, R. 390, 481).
However, the Order to Show Cause actually issued by the Court was not signed until
May 13, 2003 and was actually filed by the clerk on the date of May 13, 2003. (Add. 3, last
page, R. 232-233). Although the trial judge's unsworn statement from the bench was that
he actually approved and authorized the issuance of the Order to Show Cause on May 12,
2003 and thus that date is the date upon which the probationary period was tolled as a result
of his signing the Order to Show Cause, the fact that it was not signed nor issued, nor filed
with the Court until May 13, 2003 is a matter of record (Add. 3, R. 232, 233). The Judge's
unsworn testimony with regard to the date of May 12, 2003 should not have been admitted
as a basis for establishing the "alternative date for tolling the probationary period" as
indicated in the Judge's Order of July 2, 2003.
The Court found that the provisions of U.C.A. § 77-18-1(1 l)(b) were in full force and
effect in the instant case beginning on May 9, 2003, the date upon which Mr. Egelund

2

See Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3 E.(l)(d)(iv) which reads as follows,
*w( 1) a judge shall enter a disqualification in a proceeding in which the judge's impartiality
might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to instances where: E.(l)(d)(iv)
is to the judge's knowledge likely to be a material witness in the proceeding."
10

testified that he date stamped his original Progress/Violation Report, despite the fact that the
date stamp was changed by someone in the Court system to May 13, 2003 and not formally
filed with the Court until May 13, 2003. (Add. 4. p. 4. R. 389). The concept of "filing * a
Court document is determined almost exclusively by the date upon which Court records show
the document was filed, and not by extrinsic testimony. In considering the question of
whether or not a notice of appeal was timely filed, the Utah Court of Appeals stated:
In determining whether a notice of appeal is timely filed and establishes
jurisdiction in an appellate court, this court must be bound by the filing date
indicated on the notice of appeal transmitted to it by the trial court. This
requirement is implicit in provisions of our rules governing timeliness of an
appeal. We are therefore bound by the date stamped on appellant's notice of
appeal, and must dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In re K.G., 2002
LIT App 3. 2002 WL 23812, at *1 (Jan. 4, 2002).
In State v. Parker, 936 P.2d 1118 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), the court dismissed a
prisoner's appeal as untimely by one day even though it took nine days for the court clerk to
stamp the appeal. Judgment had been entered on October 25, 1994; the prisoner had mailed
his notice of appeal on November 19, 1994 but it was not date-stamped until November 28,
1994—one day after the expiration of the time limit for filing notice of appeal (since it was
a Monday). Parker, 936 P.2d at 1118-19. In dismissing the appeal, the Parker court declined
to adopt the widely-accepted "prison delivery rule" because 'it is not consistent with the
plain language of Utah Rule of Appellate Procedure 4 [which requires that notice of appeal
"shall be filed with the clerk of the district court within 30 days after the date of entry of the
judgment ... |." Parker, 936 P.2d at 1122.
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If the date-stamp is so determinative and enforced so strictly against criminal
defendants, the State should be held to a similar standard given that its agents can handdeliver the documents and wait in person for them to be stamped, or stamp them themselves.
It would be easy for abuse to occur in the Court system if a probation agent who may have
failed to file a certain report with the Court by a specific deadline realized that he could
simply go in and stamp a first page of such a report on the due date without actually filing
it with the Court until some days later. Certainly, this Court ought not to go by extrinsic
testimony as to when the date stamp might have been placed on the document by Agent
Egelund, but should go by the date that Court records show it was actually filed with the
Court. If the date it was actually filed by the Court is not important and has no meaning, why
then would the Court not give it the official date upon which it was date stamped by the
individual who filed it? The date of filing is extremely important as indicated above, and
May 13, 2003, the date that the Progress/Violation Report was considered by Court records
to be filed, and the date upon which the Court signed the Order to Show Cause, should be
the dispositive dates in this matter.
POINT II.

DEFENDANT'S PROBATION ENDED BY OPERATION OF
LAW ON MAY 12, 2003, AND THE COURT LOST
JURISDICTION OVER HIM AT THAT TIME, BECAUSE HE
WAS NOT PROVIDED NOTICE OF THE COURT'S ACTION
UNTIL MAY 19, 2003.

The Utah Supreme Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have ruled in numerous cases
that a trial court's power to grant, modify, or revoke probation is purely statutory, and
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although the trial court has discretion in these matters, the trial court's discretion must be
exercised within limits imposed by the legislature.3 Since U.C.A. § 77-18-1 (10)(a)(i) (as
amended 2003) requires a termination of probation "upon completion without violation of
36 months probation/" it is the position of Defendant that the Court did not have jurisdiction
to proceed with the Order to Show Cause against him. The filing of the Progress/Violation
Report and Order to Show Cause on May 13, 2003 was not sufficient to create jurisdiction
in the Court when such jurisdiction automatically terminated on May 11, 2003 at midnight
by operation of law (or May 12, 2003 at midnight as the Court may determine). Therefore,
the Court should have granted Defendant's Motion to Dismiss the Order to Show Cause for
Lack of Jurisdiction in the Court. In addition to the foregoing however. Defendant's right
to due process of law under both the U.S. and Utah Constitutions was violated because he
was not provided with notice of the Court's action until May 19, 2003.
*'

Although there was controversy in the lower court regarding the precise date that

documents prepared by AP&P were "filed*', there was no conflicting evidence regarding the
date upon which the Defendant was served with notice of the Order to Show Cause. The
Defendant was served on May 19, 2003, at least seven days after his probation should have
terminated by operation of law according to the Court's records (Add. 3, R. 233).
Furthermore. Agent Egelund testified at the hearing in the above-entitled matter that he did

" Sec, Slate v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988); State v. CowdelL 626 P.2d 487
(Utah 1981): Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990); State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203
(Utah App. 1992).
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not serve the Defendant until May 19, 2003 because "(T)hat was the soonest I was going to
see him.v Mr. Egelund admitted that he didn't make any extra effort to notify him of the
Order to Show Cause hearing and the possibility that the Court would revoke, extend or
modify his probation until May 19th. (R. 481, p. 22,1. 8-20). Furthermore, Agent Egelund
admitted that he informed the Defendant prior to May 12, 2003 that his intention was to
recommend to Judge Hanson that his probation be terminated and the matter of restitution
be handled through the civil process as a judgment (R. 481, p. 22,1. 21-25, p. 23,1. 1-14).
In addition to the foregoing, the Court itself, in making its comments at the Order to
Show Cause hearing on June 23, 2003, made the following statement:
THE COURT: Mr. Keller, when Mr. Egelund came down he says, *;Mr. Orr's
probation is going to terminate. We don't want to deal with him any more,"
and 1 said, "Wrong. I want you to deal with him. I want probation to continue,
because he won't pay unless I am holding the prison term over his head,"
which is evidenced by the fact that he apparently hasn't made the May
payment or the June payment. (R. 481, p. 30,1. 3-9).
Therefore, the evidence is clear that Defendant was led by his probation officer to
believe that the probation officer was going to recommend termination and that his probation
would be terminated and he would be required to continue to pay restitution as part of the
civil process. It was a shock to Defendant when he was served with the Order to Show
Cause on May 19, 2003.
It is the contention of Defendant that his probation ended by operation oflaw on either
May 11, 2003 or May 12,2003, and the Court lost jurisdiction over him at that time, because
he was not provided notice of the Court's action until May 19, 2003. In State v. Rawlings,
14

893 P.2d 1063 (Utah App. 1995), the Utah Court of Appeals held that a trial court lost
jurisdiction to initiate probation extension proceedings against the probationer upon
expiration of probation. In that case, Defendant had been sentenced on October 11, 1985
after pleading guilty to a single count of attempted sodomy on a child, a first degree felony.
Defendant's probation was to expire by operation of law on May 6. 1987 by virtue of his
ha\ ing completed eighteen months on probation. Although the Adult Probation & Parole
department generated a memorandum directed to the trial court which suggested extending
the Defendant's probation because he needed to continue in treatment, no motion was filed
or made by the court or prosecutor to extend Defendant's probation. The Court of Appeals
there noted that, although the trial court was apparently made aware of the recommendation
and a hearing was scheduled, the Defendant received nothing in writing and only learned of
the hearing when advised thereof casually by a hospital aid two days before the hearing date.
The court then extended Defendant's probation for an additional eighteen months. Id. at
1065.
The Utah Court of Appeals held that "(I)t is well settled that a probationer shall be
accorded due process at revocation proceedings because revoking probation seriously
deprives a person or his or her liberty." (citations omitted)... Id. at 1067. Although the Court
went on to note that the matter was less clear with regard to probation extension proceedings,
~...because of the high risk of prejudice to the probationer when he or she is not given notice
of the extension hearing and the hearing is conducted ex-parte, these courts have invoked
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their supenisory powers requiring the necessary parties to (1) give the probationer notice of
the extension hearing; (2) advise the probationer that he or she has a right to a hearing and7or
(3) advise the probationer that he or she has the right to the assistance of counsel." (citations
omitted) Id. at 1067.
The Court then specifically ruled: "We hold that a probationer in the State of Utah is
accorded a measure of due process at a probation extension proceeding and is thus entitled
to the available protections." Id.
In the instant case, Defendant Orr was not notified of any type of action being taken
against him until May 19, 2003, seven (or eight) days after his probation terminated by
operation of law. The instant Order to Show Cause was styled as a probation revocation
hearing at which the Court was being asked by Adult Probation & Parole to consider
revoking the Defendant's probation and send him to prison. Therefore, all of the due process
requirements of a probation revocation hearing, including proper notice of the proceedings
prior to the time probation terminates by operation of law, must be provided to the
Defendant, or it becomes a violation of his right to due process of law as held by the Court
in Rowlings.
The Utah Supreme Court weighed in on the issue in State v. Call, 980 P.2d 201 (Utah
1999). The Court reiterated the proposition that:
(Prior) cases instruct that if it is the intent of the state to extend the
probationary period beyond its original term, the state must take definitive
action to extend the term before the expiration date, and the probationer
must be given notice of that intent otherwise the probationer is left in a state
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of uncertainty, not knowing whether to continue to observe the terms of his
probation.
(Emphasis added). 980 P.2d ^11 at 203.
The court cited its previous cases in State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988) and
Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) for this proposition, and clearly indicated in Call
that this principle was still good law in this State. However, due to the fact that the defendant
in Call had signed a waiver of personal appearance, and a waiver of his right to a hearing and
an agreement to extend his probation for an additional year prior to the date that the
probation terminated by operation of law, the court ruled against the defendant in that
particular case. Nevertheless, as indicated previously, the court clearly stated that due
process requires that the state must take definitive action to extend the term before the
expiration date of the probation and the probationer must be given notice of that intent.
In Defendant Orrs case, definitive action was not taken until May 13, 2003 and Defendant
wasn't notified until May 19, 2003 of the Court's action.
This issue was elucidated even more clearly by the Utah Court of Appeals in the case
of State v. Grate, 947 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1997). In that case, defendant was sentenced
on January 16. 1987 to 1-15 years in prison and was placed on 18 months probation. The
Adult Probation & Parole Department filed an Incident Report with the trial court on June
12. 1987 alleging Grate had violated his probation by being arrested for auto burglary. Grate
had been arrested on July 8, 1987 on the court's bench warrant based upon the Incident
Report and the court noted that Grate's 18-month probation period was due to terminate on
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July 15, 1988. However, because AP&P did not file its Affidavit in Support of an Order to
Show Cause until July 2 L 1988 and Grate was not served with the Order to Show Cause
until August 9, 1988 the court ultimately ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction to
proceed with the Order to Show Cause as defendant's probation had terminated by operation
oflawonJul) 15, 1988.
In the Grate case, the Court stated:
Under Utah law, it is the notice to a person of the commencement of a judicial
enforcement action that distinguishes the filing of an information in a criminal
proceeding or the issuance of an OSC in a probation setting, from the filing of
an incident report. In each of the former instances, there is no ambiguity as to
the State's intention to enforce its rights within a judicial proceeding or the
defendant's need to prepare a defense. Furthermore, all the procedural
structures which attach to a court proceeding are activated.
In contrast, the filing of an incident report does not commence a probation
revocation proceeding. See, Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-29(1) (1987). Such
report need not be served on the probationer, nor does the filing necessarily
activate any court proceeding or require the probationer to respond. See
Id. Indeed, a probationer may never learn about the filing of such a report. . .
. rather, it is only when a probationer is served with an OSC that the
probationer receives actual notice of the state's decision to proceed
against the probationer for any violations. . . .
(Emphasis supplied) 947 P.2d at 1165.
The court found that the critical element involved in the process was notice to the
probationer that action was to be taken against him. The court went on to state:
Most obviously, the notice must inform the probationer of the specific
violations the state believes he or she has committed. Equally important,
however, is that such notice inform the probationer that he or she is being rather than may at some future date be - called into court to respond to the
state's allegations . . .
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However. Grate received no notice within his initial probation term of an
imminent need to appear in court to respond to those allegations. . . .
We conclude that a probationer is not charged with a probation violation
within § 77-18-l(8)(a) until he or she has received written notice both of
the nature of the allegations against him or her and of the pendency of an
enforcement action in the trial court requiring a response. We further
conclude that because Grate was not charged with a probation violation within
the original term of his probation, his probation terminated as a matter of law7
on July 15, 1988, such that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to revoke Grate's
probation on August 12. 1988. We therefore reverse the trial court's denial of
Grate's 1999 Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence.
(Emphasis supplied). 947 P.2d at 1168.
In the Grate case, the Court analyzed the previous cases of the Utah Supreme Court
which it believed supported its decision in that case. The Court looked at Smith v. Cook, 803
P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) and noted that the Court had reviewed a proceeding in which an
affidavit supporting an Order to Show Cause was filed within the probationer's term but the
Order to Show Cause was not served on the probationer until after that term had expired.
The Grate court observed ". . . In rejecting the state's argument that filing of the affidavit
tolled the running of the probationer's term, the court focused on both 'the nature and degree
of notice to which an individual is entitled (under § 77-18-1) prior to a revocation hearing.'
Id at 795". 947 P.2d at 1166.
As the Grate court noted, the Utah Supreme Court in Smith v. Cook concluded
. . . (T)hat the "emphasis on notice . . . is consistent with the assertion that a
court retains authority to revoke probation if the probationer is served with
notice of the revocation proceedings within the probation period" and that the
"assertion that a probationer is entitled to notice within the period of probation
in order for the court to retain the authority to revoke probation is consistent
with the rationale underlying our decision in Green" Cook, 803 P.2d at 795
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(emphasis added). This court later reiterated that proper notice must be
""reasonably calculated under all the circumstances, to apprise interested
parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present
their objections/" Rowlings, 893 P.2d at 1069 (emphasis added) (quoting
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1212 (Utah 1983) (citation omitted)).
(Emphasis in original) Id. at 1166.
This decision in State v. Grate by the Utah Court of Appeals was handed down on
October 30, 1997. It should be noted that the tolling statute relied upon by the Court in the
instant case. Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(11 )(b) (1996) (as amended in 1989) was in full force
and effect. The Utah Court of Appeals in that case reversed a trial court that had denied
Grate's motion (essentially a motion to dismiss the probation revocation proceedings) on the
basis that the filing of the Incident Report on June 12, 1987 had tolled the running of Grate's
probation under § 77-18-1(1 l)(b) until the OSC was signed on July 19,1988. The trial court
had rejected Grate's claim that the tolling of the probation period without notice to him had
violated his due process rights. As indicated, the Court of Appeals reversed.
The trial court in the instant case relied on this same tolling provision of the Utah
Code to deny Defendant Orr's Motion to Dismiss (Add. 4, p. 7, R. 392). It is clear that
Defendant On* was not served with notice of AP&P's Incident Report and the OSC until
seven days after his probation ended. This and the fact that he was lulled into believing that
the Adult Probation & Parole Department and the Court would terminate his probation on
May 12, 2003 should be a dispositive factor in this Court's analysis. Defendant's due
process rights under both Article I § 12 of the Utah Constitution and the Fifth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution were violated in this circumstance, much the same as defendant
20

Grate's rights were held to have been violated by the Utah Court of Appeals in his situation.
The Court declined to consider any violation of the Defendant Orr's right of due process of
law by virtue of the fact that he was not served until May 19. 2003, seven days after his
probation was scheduled to terminate by operation of law. (Add. 4. p. 6-7, R. 391-392).
The Grate court considered this tolling provision of Utah law and determined that it
had no force and effect because of the failure of the State of Utah to have served the
defendant with the Order to Show Cause until several days after his probation was due to
terminate. Because the defendant was denied legal notice, it was a violation of his right to
fundamental fairness embodied in the due process clause of the United States Constitution.
See, Grate al 1163. 1167.4

4

Although the Utah Court of Appeals ruled in the case of State v. Reedy, 937 P.2d
152 (Utah App. 1997) that § 77-18-1(1 l)(b) (1995) prevented the court from being
required to dismiss that particular case for lack of jurisdiction because a violation report
was filed with a trial court and a warrant for the defendant's arrest was issued, the court
found that the defendant had "made service impracticable since he left Utah without
permission and was in California when he claims he should have been served." Id. at
153. Because this case was decided several months prior to the Grate case, and because it
is clear that the defendant had left the jurisdiction and could not be served with the
court's proposed action violating his probation, Defendant Orr maintains that this case is
inapposite and does not affect the dismissal requested by him. Reedy's due process rights
were essentially waived by his evasion of supervision and leaving the state so he could
not be located to be served. No such facts exist in the instant case. If it were otherwise,
the Grate court surely would have relied on Reedy as precedent. Reedy was decided April
17. 1997 and Grate was decided October 30, 1997. Davis, P.J. sat on both panels.
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO EXTEND
PROBATION BECAUSE IT DID NOT ENTER ANY FINDING
THAT DEFENDANT VIOLATED A CONDITION OF HIS
PROBATION, LET ALONE ANY FINDING THAT SUCH A
VIOLATION WAS WILLFUL.
Under Utah law, "[probation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the probationer
has violated the conditions of probation." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(12)(a)(i) (2003).
Furthermore, "[probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding
that the conditions of probation have been violated." Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (12)(a)(ii)
(2003). In other words, the sentencing court must reveal both "the evidence relied on and
the reasons for revoking probation" in order "to enable a reviewing court to accurately
determine the basis for the trial court's decision." State v. Hodges, 798 P.2d 270, 274 (Utah
Ct. App. 1990); see also Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338-39 (Utah 1979) (noting that
the reviewing function of an appellate court is seriously undermined where findings are
insufficiently detailed to disclose the steps by which ultimate conclusions are reached—in
the context of a civil case, where no liberty interest was at stake). In the instant case, the
district court ordered Defendant Orr's probation extended, but entered no "finding that the
conditions of probation ha[d] been violated[,]" as required under section 77-18-1(12)(a)(i)
or (ii). Therefore, the trial court had no basis for ordering an extension of Defendant Orr's
formal probation.
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In the context of an allegation that probation has been violated by a failure to pay
restitution, the standards are even stricter. Where the alleged violation is a failure to pay a
fine and/or restitution, the sentencing court "must either find that probationer was at fault or
that alternatives other than imprisonment are inadequate to meet the state's interests in
punishment and deterrence." See Hodges, 798 P.2d at 276 (citing Bear den v. Georgia, 461
U.S. 660. 662 (1983)). As the Hodges court stated. "[w]e believe that... in order to revoke
probation, a violation of a probation condition must, as a general rule, be willful/'* Hodges,
798 P.2d at 276. In the context of an alleged failure to pay restitution (i.e. as grounds for
revocation/modification of probation), "a finding of willfulness merely requires a finding that
the probationer did not make bonafide efforts to meet the conditions of his probation/' State
v. Petersen, 869 P.2d 989, 991 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (internal quotations, citation omitted;
emphasis in original). In the instant case, the district court made no finding that Defendant
O r had violated any term of his probation, let alone that such an alleged violation was
willful. Without finding both a violation and willfulness (i.e. the absence of bona fide
efforts to pay restitution), the district court had no basis for ordering an extension of his
probation, even if this Court rules it still had jurisdiction/

s

If the Court chooses to reverse and remand on this issue, it is respectfully
requested the Court decide the other issues as well, because once the Court issues
findings upon remand, the same issues will need to be appealed again. Judicial economy
should dictate this result.
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POINT IV. THE DISTRICT COURT EXCEEDED ITS AUTHORITY IN
ORDERING PROBATION BEYOND THE STATUTORILY
MANDATED TIME FRAME AND STRUCTURE.
As indicated previously in this brief, a court's poAver to grant, modify, or revoke
probation is purely statutory, and although a trial court has discretion in these matters, the
trial court's discretion must be exercised within limits imposed by the legislature, Smith v.
Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990); State v. Green, 757 p.2d 462 (Utah 1988); See also State
v. CowdelU 626 P.2d 487 (Utah 1981). Therefore, it stands to reason that a court cannot
sentence a defendant to any particular term of probation without specific legislative authority
to do so.
In the instant case, the trial judge concluded he had authority and discretion to "extend
the defendant's probation up to the remaining term of the court's original sentence (equating
to 10 years)."* Although the trial court concluded that whatever flexibility it had in
sentencing must be exercised within legislatively established limits and quoted State v.
Green, the Court went on to conclude "Further, the Court can find no express limitation on
the permissible length of probation; only that the probation, together with any extensions, not
exceed the legislatively established sentencing guidelines." (R. 392-393). The Court cited
no authority for this proposition, and concluded from this principle that it had discretion,
apparently from its inherent powers, to extend the Defendant's probation up to the remaining

'' The Court had sentenced the Defendant to two consecutive terms of 0-5 years in
the Utah State Prison and suspended that sentence (R. 22, 23).
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term of the Court's original sentence (equating to ten years). Since we know that the trial
court's power to extend probation must be exercised within limits imposed by the legislature,
we must look to the legislature to determine what powers it has granted the Court in this
regard. The inherent powers of the Court play no part in this analysis under the controlling
case law cited earlier in this point.
Utah Code Ann. §77-18-1(10)(a) is the statute which places a limitation on the power
of the Court with regard to the time a Court may keep an individual on probation. This
statute has been amended from time to time, and was previously eighteen months. The
statute presently reads ww( 10)(a)(i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion
of the Court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in felony or class
A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B or C misdemeanors or infractions."
There is no jurisdiction of the C art to place Defendant on formal probation in excess of
thirty-six months, except as provided in subsection (12)(a)(i) and (ii) which allows probation
to be modified, extended or revoked upon a finding that probationer had violated the
conditions of probation. Defendant could find no Utah case which addresses the length of
lime probation may be extended upon a determination that there has been a probation
\ iolation. but it is presumed it could not be extended in excess of the thirty-six months
allowed under subsection (10)(a)(i).7

7

It should be noted that if probation expires or terminates under (10)(a)(i) and an
unpaid balance remains regarding restitution, the Court may retain jurisdiction of the case
and continue the Defendant on bench probation. There appears to be no time limit on this
25

In addition to the foregoing, the Court made clear that the only purpose for the
extension of probation for the ten year term was that the Judge believed thatfcfc(B)ecausethe
defendant's only incentive to continue making restitution payments is to avoid his probation
being revoked, the court invokes the full scope of its discretion to extend the defendant's
probation for the maximum length permissible, the remaining full term of his sentence of 10
years/* (Add. 4, p. 8, R. 393).
It is noteworthy that the Defendant was never asked to admit or deny the allegation
of failure to pay restitution against him, and the Court never entered any finding with regard
to the Defendant's failure to pay restitution as being a violation of probation. See Point III
supra. Although defense counsel pointed out to the Court that if the Court intended to keep
Defendant on probation for purposes of payment of restitution, it would be necessary to make
that a bench probation rather than a formal probation with AP&P, the Court concluded "The
tolling of the defendant's probation period prior to it's legislative termination sounds a death
knell to two of the defendant's principle arguments. First the defendant argues that under
§ 77-18-1 (10)(a)(ii)(A) this Court can retain jurisdiction over him only under the form of a
bench probation. However, this provision never comes into play because the Defendant's
probation did not expire or terminate under § 77-18-10(a)(i), but was instead tolled under §
77-18-1(1 l)(b). ..."(R. 391).

authority, but it is to be noted that this section does not address formal probation with the
Utah State Department of Adult Probation & Parole. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18l(10)(a)(ii)(A) (2003).
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The Court mistakenly determined that the mere fact that it found that Defendant's
probation was tol led under §77-18-1(11 )(b) and therefore the filing of the Progress/Violation
Report and Order to Show Cause were within the time period of Defendant's probation, he
could automatically ignore §77-18-1(10)(a)(ii)(A). It is again noteworthy that at no time did
the Court make a finding that Defendant had violated his probation. The Court simply
assumed that because it was clear the Defendant had not paid the full amount of restitution
ordered of $110,000.00 (R. 121, 122), as well as the additional $255,504.39 added to the
restitution by Order of January 31, 2002 (R. 170, 171), the Defendant had failed to pay full
restitution. In fact, the Defendant had been paying $ 1,000.00 a month for thirty-six months
as ordered by the Court in its original Sentencing, but it was clear the Defendant had thus far
paid only $36,000.00 at most (R. 26-27).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(10)(a)(i)(A) reads as follows:
If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period under subsection
(10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance upon the account receivable as
defined in § 76-3-201.1, the court may retain jurisdiction of the case and
continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing
the payment of the account receivable.
As stated previously, the Court simply determined that there was no expiration or
termination of the probation period under subsection (10)(a)(i) based upon the tolling statute,
and therefore he was entitled to extend the Defendant's probation an additional seven years
(ten years minus the three years previously served on probation). Defendant argues that the
Court has misinterpreted the law.
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The Utah Court of Appeals interpreted the forerunner of § 77-18-1 (10)(a)(ii) in the
case of State v. Dickey, 841 P.2d 1203 (Utah App. 1992) in which a defendant had plead
guilty to criminal mischief and was ordered to pay a certain amount in restitution and placed
on probation. In that case, the Court of Appeals held that although the court's jurisdiction
regarding defendant's compliance with probation conditions had lapsed after a certain period
of time, the court retained jurisdiction to enforce the payment of restitution to the victim. In
that case, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled:
%

\ . . this court concludes, however, that the subsection is actually intended to
insure that mandatory termination of probation not affect the trial court's
jurisdiction for the purpose of collecting restitution. The legislature
anticipated both situations where the court might order restitution but no
probation and situations where the court might decide upon a payment
schedule for restitution which would extend beyond the probation period. The
legislature, therefore, provided a separate, limited source of jurisdiction by
which the court could recall a defendant and hold him or her accountable for
full payment of restitution or fines according to the sentencing order to which
defendant had previously agreed."
841 P.2dat 1208.
Therefore, it would seem that the legislature granted jurisdiction to the Court to enforce
restitution independent of the probationary status of the defendant.
In the case of State v. Allen, 2000 UT App. 340, 15 P.3d 110, the Utah Court of
Appeals illuminated its decision in Dickey by first noting that the general rule is that a trial
court may not extend probationary jurisdiction to enforce conditions of probation unless
extension proceedings are timely initiated (citing Smith v. Cook and State v. Green, supra.)
The Court went on to state as follows:
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However. Utah law provides an independent legal basis for restitution,
allowing a court to require a defendant to pay restitution after his probation has
been terminated . . .
Recent!}', this court reemphasized that trial court's ma}' retain jurisdiction over
criminal defendants for purposes of restitution, independent of a defendant's
probationary status. In State v Nones, the defendant argued that under
changes in the restitution statute made since Dickey, the trial court could not
enforce its restitution order against her after probation expired. See Nones, 11
P.3d 709, 2000 UT App 211, H 4, 299 Utah Adv. Rep. 14. Applying the
reasoning of Dickey we held that the trial court retained jurisdiction despite the
legislatures clarification of the statute.
2000 UT App. 340 Tl 9, 11, 15 P.3d 110.
Thus, the conclusion is inescapable that it was absolutely not necessary for the Court
to continue Defendant Orr on formal AP&P probation for the remainder of the ten years
merely for the purpose of collecting restitution. Since the power of the Court to enforce
restitution orders exists independent of probation status, the Court clearly could have placed
Defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the payment of
restitution amounts as allowed and required under § 77-18-1(10)(a)(ii). Whether this is true
or not however, the Court simply had no authority to extend Defendant's probation for a
period often years and to maintain him on formal AP&P probation for that entire period for
the limited purpose of enforcing restitution, which was the Court's expressly stated goal.
(Add. 4, p. 8. R. 393, 481. p. 30.1. 3-9. 17-20).
CONCLUSION
Defendant respectfully requests that this Court rule that his probation terminated by
operation of law on cither May 11.2003 or May 12. 2003. and that the Court lost jurisdiction
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over him on one of those two dates. In the alternative. Defendant requests this Court find
that since the only basis for the Court's determination to extend Defendant's probation was
to pay restitution, any probation must be bench probation pursuant to the requirements of
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a)(ii)(A).
Dated this ) f day of n^c^J^—

. 2003.
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL, P.C.

LARRY O J E L L E
Attorney for Defendant
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UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

CHAPTER 18
THE JUDGMENT
Section
77-18-1.

77-18-2.
77-18-3.
77-18-4.
77-18-5.
77-18-5.5.
77-18-6.
77-18-6.5.
77-18-7.
77-18-8.
77-18-8.3.

Suspension of sentence — Pleas
held in abeyance — Probation
— Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
Terms and conditions — Termination, revocation, modification, or extension — Hearings — Electronic monitoring.
Repealed.
Disposition of fines.
Sentence — Term — Construction.
Reports by courts and prosecuting attorneys to Board of Pardons and Parole.
Judgment of death — Defendant to select method — Time
of selection.
Judgment to pay fine or restitution constitutes a hen.
Liability of rescued person for
costs of emergency response.
Costs imposed on defendant —
Restrictions.
Fine not paid — Commitment.
Special condition of sentence
during incarceration — Penalty.

Section
77-18-8.5.
77-18-9.
77-18-10.

77-18-11.

77-18-12.
77-18-13.
77-18-14.

77-18-15.
77-18-16.
77-18-17.

Special condition of probation —
• Penalty.
Definitions.
Petition — Expungement of
records of arrest, investigation, and detention — Eligibility conditions — No filing
fee.
Petition — Expungement of
conviction — Certificate of eligibility — Fee — Notice —
Written evaluation — Objections — Hearing.
Grounds for denial of certificate
of eligibility — Effect of prior
convictions.
Hearing — Standard of proof—
Exception.
Order to expunge — Distribution of order — Redaction —
Receipt of order — Administrative proceedings — Division requirements.
Retention of expunged records
— Agencies.
Penalty.
Retroactive application.

77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Pleas held in abeyance
— Probation — Supervision — Presentence investigation — Standards — Confidentiality —
Terms and conditions — Termination, revocation, modification, or extension — Hearings —
Electronic monitoring.
(1) On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction
with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the
plea in abeyance agreement.
(2) (a) On a plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, no contest, or conviction
of any crime or offense, the court may, after imposing sentence, suspend
the execution of the sentence and place the defendant on probation. The
court may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(ii) on probation with an agency of local government or with a
private organization; or
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing
court.
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(b) (i) The legal custody of all probationers under the supervision of the
department is with the department.
(ii) The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of
the sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court.
(hi) The court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers.
(3) (a) The department shall establish supervision and presentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the department. These
standards shall be based on:
(i) the type of offense;
(ii) the demand for services;
(hi) the availability of agency resources;
(iv) the public safety; and
(v) other criteria established by the department to determine what
level of services shall be provided.
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submitted to the Judicial Council and the Board of Pardons and Parole on an
annual basis for review and comment prior to adoption by the department.
(c) The Judicial Council and the department shall establish procedures
to implement the supervision and investigation standards.
(d) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually consider
modifications to the standards based upon criteria in Subsection (3)(a) and
other criteria as they consider appropriate.
(e) The Judicial Council and the department shall annually prepare an
impact report and submit it to the appropriate legislative appropriations
subcommittee.
(4) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the department is not required
to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C misdemeanors
or infractions or to conduct presentence investigation reports on class C
misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may supervise the
probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department standards.
(5) (a) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the
concurrence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of
sentence for a reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a
presentence investigation report from the department or information from
other sources about the defendant.
(b) The presentence investigation report shall include a victim impact
statement according to guidelines set in Section 77-38a-203 describing the
effect of the crime on the victim and the victim's family.
(c) The presentence investigation report shall include a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recommendation from the
department regarding the payment of restitution with interest by the
defendant in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims
Restitution Act.
(d) The contents of the presentence investigation report, including any
diagnostic evaluation report ordered by the court under Section 76-3-404,
are protected and are not available except by court order for purposes of
sentencing as provided by rule of the Judicial Council or for use by the
department.
(6) (a) The department shall provide the presentence investigation report
to the defendant's attorney, or the defendant if not represented by counsel,
the prosecutor, and the court for review, three working days prior to
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sentencing. Any alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation
report, which have not been resolved by the parties and the department
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the sentencing
judge, and the judge may grant an additional ten working days to resolve
the alleged inaccuracies of the report with the department. If after ten
working days the inaccuracies cannot be resolved, the court shall make a
determination of relevance and accuracy on the record.
(b) If a party fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered
to be waived.
(7) At the time of sentence, the court shall receive any testimony, evidence,
or information the defendant or the prosecuting attorney desires to present
concerning the appropriate sentence. This testimony, evidence, or information
shall be presented in open court on record and in the presence of the defendant.
(8) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the court may
require that the defendant:
(a) perform any or all of the following:
(i) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being
placed on probation;
(ii) pay amounts required under Title 77, Chapter 32a, Defense
Costs;
(hi) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally
liable;
(iv) participate in available treatment programs;
(v) serve a period of time, not to exceed one year, in a county jail
designated by the department, after considering any recommendation
by the court as to which jail the court finds most appropriate;
(vi) serve a term of home confinement, which may include the use
of electronic monitoring;
(vii) participate in compensatory service restitution programs, including the compensatory service program provided in Section 78-1120.7;
(viii) pay for the costs of investigation, probation, and treatment
services;
(ix) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims with
interest in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 38a, Crime Victims
Restitution Act; and
(x) comply with other terms and conditions the court considers
appropriate; and
(b) if convicted on or after May 5, 1997:
(i) complete high school classwork and obtain a high school graduation diploma, a GED certificate, or a vocational certificate at the
defendant's own expense if the defendant has not received the
diploma, GED certificate, or vocational certificate prior to being
placed on probation; or
(ii) provide documentation of the inability to obtain one of the items
listed in Subsection (8)(b)(i) because of:
(A) a diagnosed learning disability; or
(B) other justified cause.
(9) The department shall collect and disburse the account receivable as
defined by Section 76-3-201.1, with interest and any other costs assessed under
Section 64-13-21 during:
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(a) the parole period and any extension of that period in accordance
with Subsection 77-27-6(4); and
(b) the probation period in cases for which the court orders supervised
probation and any extension of that period by the department in accordance with Subsection (10).
(10) (a) (i) Probation may be terminated at any time at the discretion of the
court or upon completion without violation of 36 months probation in
felony or class A misdemeanor cases, or 12 months in cases of class B
or C misdemeanors or infractions,
(ii) (A) If, upon expiration or termination of the probation period
under Subsection (10)(a)(i), there remains an unpaid balance
upon the account receivable as defined in Section 76-3-201.1, the
court may retain jurisdiction of the case and continue the defendant on bench probation for the limited purpose of enforcing the
payment of the account receivable.
(B) In accordance with Section 77-18-6, the court shall record
in the registry of civil judgments any unpaid balance not already
recorded and immediately transfer responsibility to collect the
account to the Office of State Debt Collection,
(iii) Upon motion of the Office of State Debt Collection, prosecutor,
victim, or upon its own motion, the court may require the defendant to
show cause why his failure to pay should not be treated as contempt
of court,
(b) (i) The department shall notify the sentencing court, the Office of
State Debt Collection, and the prosecuting attorney in writing in
advance in all cases when termination of supervised probation will
occur by law.
(ii) The notification shall include a probation progress report and
complete report of details on outstanding accounts receivable.
(11) (a) (i) Any time served by a probationer outside of confinement after
having been charged with a probation violation and prior to a hearing
to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward the total
probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing to
revoke the probation.
(ii) Any time served in confinement awaiting a hearing or decision
concerning revocation of probation does not constitute service of time
toward the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated
at the hearing.
(b) The running of the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a
violation report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show cause or
warrant by the court.
(12) (a) (i) Probation may not be modified or extended except upon wsdver
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in
court that the probationer has violated the conditions of probation.
(ii) Probation may not be revoked except upon a hearing in court
and a finding that the conditions of probation have been violated,
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facts
asserted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the
court that authorized probation shall determine if the affidavit
establishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or
extension of probation is justified.
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(ii) If the court determines there is probable cause, it shall cause to
be served on the defendant a warrant for his arrest or a copy of the
affidavit and an order to show cause why his probation should not be
revoked, modified, or extended.
(c) (i) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the
hearing and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior
to the hearing.
(ii) The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance.
(hi) The order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right
to be represented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel
appointed for him if he is indigent.
(iv) The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to present
evidence.
(d) (i) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations
of the affidavit.
(ii) If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations.
(hi) The persons who have given adverse information on which the
allegations are based shall be presented as witnesses subject to
questioning by the defendant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders.
(iv) The defendant may call witnesses, appear and speak in his own
behalf, and present evidence.
(e) (i) After the hearing the court shall make findings of fact.
(ii) Upon a finding that the defendant violated the conditions of
probation, the court may order the probation revoked, modified,
continued, or that the entire probation term commence anew.
(hi) If probation is revoked, the defendant shall be sentenced or the
sentence previously imposed shall be executed.
(13) The court may order the defendant to commit himself to the custody of
the Division of Substance Abuse and Mental Health for treatment at the Utah
State Hospital as a condition of probation or stay of sentence, only sifter the
superintendent of the Utah State Hospital or his designee has certified to the
court that:
(a) the defendant is appropriate for and can benefit from treatment at
the state hospital;
(b) treatment space at the hospital is available for the defendant; and
(c) persons described in Subsection 62A-15-610(2)(g) are receiving priority for treatment over the defendants described in this Subsection (13).
(14) Presentence investigation reports, including presentence diagnostic
evaluations, are classified protected in accordance with Title 63, Chapter 2,
Government Records Access and Management Act. Notwithstanding Sections
63-2-403 and 63-2-404, the State Records Committee may not order the
disclosure of a presentence investigation report. Except for disclosure at the
time of sentencing pursuant to this section, the department may disclose the
presentence investigation only when:
(a) ordered by the court pursuant to Subsection 63-2-202(7);
(b) requested by a law enforcement agency or other agency approved by
the department for purposes of supervision, confinement, and treatment of
the offender;
(c) requested by the Board of Pardons and Parole;
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(d) requested by the subject of the presentence investigation report or
the subject's authorized representative; or
(e) requested by the victim of the crime discussed in the presentence
investigation report or the victim's authorized representative, provided
that the disclosure to the victim shall include only information relating to
statements or materials provided by the victim, to the circumstances of the
crime including statements by the defendant, or to the impact of the crime
on the victim or the victim's household.
(15) (a) The court shall consider home confinement as a condition of
probation under the supervision of the department, except as provided in
Sections 76-3-406 and 76-5-406.5.
(b) The department shall establish procedures and standards for home
confinement, including electronic monitoring, for all individuals referred
to the department in accordance with Subsection (16).
(16) (a) If the court places the defendant on probation under this section, it
may order the defendant to participate in home confinement through the
use of electronic monitoring as described in this section until further order
of the court.
(b) The electronic monitoring shall alert the department and the
appropriate law enforcement unit of the defendant's whereabouts.
(c) The electronic monitoring device shall be used under conditions
which require:
(i) the defendant to wear an electronic monitoring device at all
times; and
(ii) that a device be placed in the home of the defendant, so that the
defendant's compliance with the court's order may be monitored.
(d) If a court orders a defendant to participate in home confinement
through electronic monitoring as a condition of probation under this
section, it shall:
(i) place the defendant on probation under the supervision of the
Department of Corrections;
(ii) order the department to place an electronic monitoring device
on the defendant and install electronic monitoring equipment in the
residence of the defendant; and
(iii) order the defendant to pay the costs associated with home
confinement to the department or the program provider.
(e) The department shall pay the costs of home confinement through
electronic monitoring only for those persons who have been determined to
be indigent by the court.
(f) The department may provide the electronic monitoring described in
this section either directly or by contract with a private provider.
History: C. 1953, 77-18-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2; 1981, ch. 59, § 2; 1982, ch.
9, § 1; 1983, ch. 47, § 1; 1983, ch. 68, § 1;
1983, ch. 85, § 2; 1984, ch. 20, § 1; 1985, ch.
212, § 17; 1985, ch. 229, § 1; 1987, ch. 114,
§ 1; 1989, ch. 226, § 1; 1990, ch. 134, § 2;
1991, ch. 66, § 5; 1991, ch. 206, § 6; 1992, ch.
14, § 3; 1993, ch. 82, § 7; 1993, ch. 220, § 3;
1994, ch. 13, § 24; 1994, ch. 198, § 1; 1994,
ch. 230, § 1; 1995, ch. 20, § 146; 1995, ch.
117, § 2; 1995, ch. 184, § 1; 1995, ch. 301, § 3;
1995, ch. 337, § 11; 1995, ch. 352, § 6; 1996,

ch. 79, § 103; 1997, ch. 392, § 2; 1998, ch. 94,
§ 10; 1999, ch. 279, § 8; 1999, ch. 287, § 7;
2001, ch. 137, § l;2002,ch.35,§ 7; 2002 (5th
S.S.), ch. 8, § 137; 2003, ch. 290, § 3.
Amendment Notes. — The 1999 amendment by ch. 279, effective May 3, 1999, substituted references to accounts receivable under §
76-3-201.1 for references to fines, restitution,
and other assessed costs under Subsection 763-201(4) in Subsections (9) and (10); deleted
"upon order of the court" before "shall collect"
near the beginning of Subsection (9); added
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IN THE 3RD DISTRICT - SALT LAKE CITY
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF

&EPUTY CLERK

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff,

AFFIDAVIT I N S U P P O R T O F
ORDER T O S H O W C A U S E

VS

COURT C A S E N O : 0 0 1 9 0 2 7 7 2

ORR, David Jay
Defendant,

JUDGE: Timothy R. Hanson
D E F A T T Y : Larry R. Keller

S T A T E OF U T A H

)
):ss

C O U N T Y OF S A L T L A K E

):

R O B E R T E G E L L N D , being duly sworn upon an oath deposes and says that: H e i s a
Probation Officer for the Utah State Department o f Corrections; that on the 23rd day o f March,
2 0 0 0 , the above-named defendant w a s adjudged guilty of the crime o f Real Estate Broker/Agent
With Out License, 3rd Degree Felony, Securities Fraud, 3rd Degree Felony, in the above-entitled
Court and o n the 12th day o f May, 2 0 0 0 , w a s sentenced to serve a term o f 0-5 years in the Utah
State Prison; that the execution o f the imposed sentence was stayed and the defendant w a s placed
on probation under the supervision o f the Department o f Corrections; that the above-entitled
defendant did violate the terms and conditions o f the defendant's probation as follows, to-wit:

/*<W
RE: ORR, David Jay

1. By having failed to pa) • restitution in full, as ordered, in violation of a special condition of the
Probation Agreement

WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that an Orderfromthe Court issue directing and
requiring the above-named defendant to be and appear before said Court to show cause, if any
he/she has, why the aforesaid period of probation should not be revoked, and why said defendant
should not be forthwith committed to the Utah State Prison,

ROBERT EGELl^D, PROBATION OFFICER

Subscribed and sworn to before me this

i&u—
NOTARY PUB:
Residing:
Commission expires:

.Utah
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IN THE 3RD DISTRICT - SALT LAKE CITY COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH
Plaintiff
VS

ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

ORR, David Jay

COURT CASE NO: 001902772
Defendant,

JUDGE: Timothy R_ Hanson
DEF ATTY: Larry R. Keller

UPON A READING of the Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause, the Court finds
probable cause to believe that the defendant in this matter has violated the terms and conditions
of his/her probation as sen forth in the Affidavit, and that revocation or modification of
defendant's probation is justified.
IT IS ORDERED that the defendant appear before the Honorable Timothy R. Hanson,
Judge of the above-entitled Court, at the Judge's courtroom in SALT LAKE, Utah, on the
day of ff^Oj^

2G^rat the hour of ff/^'^then and there to show cause why probation

of said defendant should jot be revoked or modified by the Court based upon the allegations
contained in the Affid&vL on file with the Court.

RE: ORR, David Jay

The defendant has arightto be represented by counsel at the above-described hearing and
to have appointed to represent the defendant if the defendant is indigent. The defendant also has
arightto present evidence as provided in the UtaH Rules of Civil Procedure.
DATED THIS

&

day oV

flfifr/j

20#2>

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that this Order to Show Cause and Affidavit in support thereof, was
personally served upon the defendant at

<=0-Af?P 3\o U- fw/r/^jf VD~y showing the

original and informing the defendant of its contents, and delivering a copy on the I^J
rlft^

20^3 additional copies were delivered to ("/Ut^j AfTMAJt^f \

the defendant, on the __^Q

day of

//ffif

ROBERT EGEL1

20^/J

PROBATION OFFICER

day of

counsel for
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FILES BISTBICT COURT
Third Judicial District

JUL - 2 2003
SALT LAKE COUNTf
By-

Deputy Clerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 001902772

vs.
DAVID JAY ORR,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court for hearing on June 23,
2003, in connection with the defendant's Motion to Dismiss Order to
Show Cause for Lack of Jurisdiction.

The State elicited testimony

from Robert Egelund, the defendant's AP&P officer. The Court
received into evidence two exhibits, consisting of Mr. Egelund's
copies of the Progress/Violation Report and the Affidavit in
Support of the Order to Show Cause (both of which were originally
filed with the Court).
Following Mr. Egelund's testimony and oral argument from the
prosecution and counsel for the defendant, the Court ruled from the
bench that the defendant's Motion to Dismiss was denied and that he
was to make up the May and June restitution payments.
took

under

advisement

the

issue

of

whether

the

The Court
defendant's

probation may be extended to the limit or term of the original
sentence. The Court also indicated to counsel that a more thorough
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discussion of the Court's legal basis for denying the Motion to
Dismiss would be included in the Memorandum Decision that the Court
would issue.

Having now again reviewed the defendant's Motion to

Dismiss (the State did not file a-jresponse) and having considered
counsel's arguments and Mr. Egelund's testimony, the Court rules as
stated herein.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
In his Motion to Dismiss, the defendant contends that this
Court

lacks the jurisdiction

proceedings

against

him

to initiate probation extension

because

these

proceedings

were

not

initiated until after probation had already terminated by operation
of law.

The defendant's argument

is based on an erroneous

presumption that his probation terminated on May 12, 2003, and that
the proceedings were not formally commenced until May 13, 2 0 03,
when he considers the Progess/Violation Report to have been filed.
The legal analysis of whether this Court has the jurisdiction
to extend the defendant's probation begins with an analysis of when
the extension proceedings were initiated in this case and when the
defendant's probation would have terminated.

As an aside, the

Court notes that the defendant takes issue with whether this Court
is even permitted to consider an extension of his probation given
that the filing of a Progress/Violation Report implies a potential
revocation proceeding and possible incarceration. According to the
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defendant, such a Report is an inappropriate vehicle for seeking an
extension of his probation, even if it had been timely filed.
The Court concludes that the styling of the report is
unimportant

given

that

the

Court

has

a

wide

latitude

and

flexibility in determining whether probation should be revoked or
modified (including the possibility of extending the probationary
term).

Because it is the Court and not AP&P that fashions these

remedies, how AP&P chooses to style the reports that it files with
the Court has no import in the Court's ultimate determination of
the appropriate remedy. In this case, the Court opts for extending
the defendant's probation, as opposed to revoking it altogether.
Therefore, the Court will refer to these proceedings as a probation
extension proceeding. Having addressed the defendant's argument on
this point, the Court proceeds to analyze the timing of the filings
that initiated this probation extension proceeding.
Under Utah Code Annotated §77-18-1(11) (b) , ,f[t]he running of
the probation period is tolled upon the filing of a violation
report with the court alleging a violation of the terms and
conditions of probation or upon the issuance of an order to show
cause or warrant by the court." The first issue therefore becomes
when the Progress/Violation Report was filed and whether it tolled
the running of the defendant's probation period under §77-181(11) (b) .
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Progress/Violation

Report

established by the credible testimony of Mr. Egelund.

was

Mr. Egelund

testified that he met with the undersigned on May 9, 2003, and
pursuant to that meeting, he returned to the Court on the same date
for the purpose of filing the Progress/Violation Report and the
Affidavit

in Support

of Order

to

Show

Cause.

Mr. Egelund

specifically testified that on May 9, 2003, he brought copies of
these documents to the Court, date-stamped them and left them in
the intake basket for the Court's clerk.

In support of this

testimony, Mr. Egelund offered his copies of the Progress/Violation
Report and the Affidavit in Support of Order to Show Cause (marked
Exhibits 1 and 2) .

A review of these documents indicates hand-

written changes to the May 9, 2003, date-stamp to reflect a date of
May 13, 2003. However, the copy of Order to Show Cause attached to
the Progress/Violation Report (Exhibit 1) has no such hand-written
change. This copy of the Order to Show Cause clearly shows a datestamp of May 9, 2003.

Taking together the documentary evidence

before the Court in light of Mr. Egelund's credible testimony, the
Court finds that the Progress/Violation Report and the Affidavit
were filed on May 9, 2003, but that for reasons that the Court need
not delve into, hand-written changes were made to the date-stamp to
reflect

an

apparent

date

that

the

documents

were

docketed.

However, the pivotal date under §77-18-1(11) (b) is not the date of
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docketing, but rather the date of filing.

In this case, this date

is easily determined by Mr. Egelund's testimony that he delivered
these documents to the Court for filing on May 9, 2 003, and that he
date-stamped the documents himself with the date of May 9, 2003.
An alternative date for tolling the probationary period is the
issuance of an order to show cause.

The documents in this case

reflect that the Court approved and authorized issuance of the
Order to Show Cause on May 12, 2003.

Having established the dates

of May 9, 2003, or May 12, 2003, as potential dates for tolling the
defendant's probationary period, the Court now proceeds to evaluate
whether these dates occurred prior to the legislative termination
of the defendant's probation.1
The defendant was placed on probation by this Court on May
12, 2000. The Court reasons that the first day of probation would
have concluded 24 hours after the sentence was imposed or at the
close of business on the following day, May 13, 2000.

1

Therefore,

During oral argument, the State alluded to a statement made
by the Court at a February 16, 2001, hearing, as providing the
basis for concluding that the Court extended the defendant's
probation at that time. Although the Court indicated at that
hearing that the defendant's probation would not terminate
pending restitution being satisfied, this statement was not
intended as a suggestion that probation was extended or that a
violation in probation had occurred. For these reasons, the
Court does not rely on the February 16, 2 001, date in its
analysis.
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the defendant's probation was set to expire by operation of law on
May 13, 2 0 03, the termination date of the defendant's 36-month
probationary period.
Progress/Violation

Accordingly, Mr. Egelund's filing of the

Report

on May

9,

2 0 03,

and

this

Court's

authorization to issue the Order to Show Cause on May 12, 2003,
both

occurred

prior

to

defendant's probation.

the

legislative

termination

of

the

The defendant's probation period was

therefore tolled either on May 9, 2003, or at the latest, May 12,
2003 .
The tolling of the defendant's probation period prior to its
legislative

termination

sounds a death knell

to two of the

defendant's principal arguments. First, the defendant argues that
under §77-18-10 (a) (ii) (A) , this Court can retain jurisdiction over
him * only under the form of a bench probation.

However, this

provision never comes into play because the defendant's probation
did not expire or terminate under §77-18-10(a) (i) , but was instead
tolled under §77-18-1(11) (b) .
Second, the defendant argues that the due process concerns of
State v. Call, 980 P. 2d 201 (Utah 1999) , have been violated in this
case because he was not notified of the State's intent to extend
his probation before the expiration of his probation period. Once
again, the holding in Call is not applicable to these facts because
the

defendant's

probation

did

not

expire,

it

was

tolled.

MEMORANDUM DECISION

PAGE 7

STATE V. ORR

Therefore, the service upon the defendant of the Order to Show
Cause on May 19, 2003, was within the probationary period and was
therefore appropriate under due process considerations.
Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that it has
jurisdiction
probation

to extend the defendant's probation because the

extension proceedings

were

initiated

prior

to the

legislative termination of the probation period and served to toll
the probation period under §77-18-1(11) (b) . The defendant's Motion
to Dismiss is therefore denied.
Having concluded that the Court has jurisdiction to extend the
defendant's probation period, the Court next considers the issue of
whether the Court can extend the defendant's probation in 3S-month
intervals or for the full duration of his remaining 10-year
sentence (two terms not to exceed 5 years, to run consecutively).
The Court's own legal research has not yielded a case or statute
addressing this precise issue. However, distilling the general law
on the trial court's discretion in matters of sentencing and
probation to its essence provides that while the Court has a large
measure of flexibility, it must be exercised "within legislatively
established limits." State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462, 464 (Utah 1988).
Further,

the

Court

can

find

no

express

limitation

on

the

permissible length of probation; only that the probation, together
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with any extensions, not exceed the legislatively established
sentencing guidelines.
Applying these concepts to this case, the Court concludes that
it has the discretion to extend the defendant's probation up to the
remaining term of the Court's original sentence (equating to 10
years).

The

defendant's

failure

to pay

the

May

and

June

installments of his restitution underscores the fact that the
defendant is induced to repay his victims only when he is in the
shadow of probation and the threat of incarceration is held over
him.

Because the defendant's only incentive to continue making

restitution payments is to avoid his probation being revoked, the
Court invokes the full scope of its discretion to extend the
defendant's probation for the maximum length permissible, the
remaining full term of his sentence of 10 years.
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court,
denying

the defendant's Motion to Dismiss and extending his

probation in the manner indicated above.
Dated this

.day o f w i ^ 2003 .

TIMO?HY R. HANSON
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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MAILING CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Memorandum Decision and Order, to the
"2^ day of*»SfeO.2003:

Howard R. Lemcke, Jr.
Deputy District Attorney
Attorney for Plaintiff
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Larry R. Keller
Attorney for Defendant
525 East 100 South, 5th Floor
P.O. Box 11008
Salt Lake City, Utah
84147-0008

following, this

